介绍:
B. National Policy
Without concerted policy advances by governments to bolster enforcement of international rules, the multilateral system to counter nuclear terrorism cannot succeed. As affirmed by the IAEA, nuclear security fundamentally remains the responsibility of states.207 Accordingly, governments must prioritize efforts to counter nuclear terrorism in their domestic and foreign policies. As an initial step, governments must become parties to all anti-terrorism conventions and bring their legalsystems into compliance with provisions that criminalize and mandate prosecution for acts of nuclear terrorism. Domestically, they should enact policies similar to the layered defense strategy utilized by the United States. This entails a multi-layered response to the threat posed by nuclear weapons, including establishing the security of domestic nuclear materials, disrupting trafficking networks, and strengthening border controls.208
As an initial step in this process, states could secure their nuclear weapons and materials in accordance with international law by using the American safeguards system as a convenient model to emulate. This system emphasizes the need for physical protection, hands-on control, and reliable means of accounting for nuclear material.209 As a minimum, this means hiring well-trained armed guards and acquiring detector technologies necessary to defend nuclear facilities. It also means ensuring limited access by persons to nuclear material, augmented by installing electronic processing methods to ensure that no nuclear material has gone missing. A second step that governments should take is to strengthen their border and port security surveillance capabilities to detect and act against attempts to smuggle nuclear weapons or material into or out of a state.210
Given the varying capabilities of states that have nuclear weapons and the reality that nuclear weapons can be transported across national boundaries, states must participate in multilateral initiatives to monitor, manage and combat a terrorist threat. Towards this end, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism should be reinvigorated with the aim of examining the places and situations where nuclear materials are at highest risk, and the international community should take hard and fast measures to secure them. Under the aegis of this partnership, the United States and Russia should work with other nuclear states to bring governments into *238 compliance with IAEA recommendations, emphasizing implementation of the CPPNM and the CNT.211 The United States and Russia should also provide these governments with the technologies and training necessary for accomplishing these objectives.212 The Initiative should act to bolster security capabilities in global “hot spots” where nuclear material remains vulnerable by using the $20 billion that the G-8 allocated in June 2002 for such purposes.213 Further measures could include allies’ testing one another’s security capabilities through actions analogous to war games. The results of these tests would remain secret while the findings and lessons learned would help states establish more appropriate security protocols.
In cases where governments are unwilling to adopt and implement these security standards, the major nuclear states should consider providing incentives for compliance. Carrots might be offered in the form of technical and foreign aid. Sticks might be wielded by instituting bans on dealing with nuclear facilities in non-cooperative states. Nuclear states could give preference in nuclear contracts to governments that perform well in real tests of their security systems. Such actions would help to reinforce the message that, in order to participate in the nuclear marketplace, states must put into practice necessary security protocols.
Additionally, governments must coordinate their police and intelligence agencies to deter and apprehend nuclear traffickers. This coordination should involve border monitoring, interdiction, sting operations, and improving rapid response to possible nuclear threats.214 Coordinated police action should also track nuclear scientists willing to sell their skills as well as black marketeers.215 Indeed, if the black market for nuclear materials is to be suppressed, a coordinated police strategy is critical to raising the costs of involvement in such illicit trade and increasing doubts about the reliability of buyers.216 Intelligence sharing can also enhance the ability of governments to detect possible illicit nuclear activities.217 In this effort, 100 governments now work with the IAEA, whose Illicit Trafficking Database provides security services with data on detected trafficking and indicators of threats and vulnerabilities in control operations and other security measures.218 To this end, Interpol agreed to a Cooperation Arrangement with the IAEA, Project Geiger, to increase its own ability to monitor nuclear trafficking.219 The IAEA also cooperates with several other international organizations to ensure nuclear security, among them the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Interpol, Europol, the Institute for *239 Transuranium Elements, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, and the World Customs Organization.220 Finally, states should join PSI through bilateral treaty arrangements with the United States in order to increase the number of ships that can be searched and help ensure that their ports are locations where interdiction can be carried out.
For the purposes of maintaining domestic security and policing regimes, national agencies for ensuring nuclear regulations and preparing security services to counter nuclear incidents should be established. Using the U.S. National Regulatory Commission as a model, other nuclear states should create or use such commissions to establish and maintain necessary standards for nuclear security. These commissions should conduct regular inspections of sites and report their findings to the IAEA.221 Governments should also establish nuclear detection administrations to coordinate U.S. and IAEA efforts to establish an effective global system. Finally, national governments must prepare and adopt strategies for first responder emergency services to handle nuclear interdictions and react to nuclear disaster incidents.
Although existing programs promoted by the United States are integral to this effort, they must be expanded if they are to be more effective. In spite of the creation in 2004 of GTRI, scant progress has been made in repatriating nuclear material to the United States from the many research reactors around the world. The United States should concentrate on removing vulnerable nuclear fuel from these reactors. For Fiscal Year 2009, the Bush Administration requested $1.083 billion to improve all controls over nuclear activites, but one analyst has estimated that at least an additional $200 million is needed to make substantial improvements on GTRI.222 Expanding the scope of this effort will undoubtedly increase its cost, yet such efforts will be cheaper than trying to consistently upgrade out-dated foreign reactors. Additionally, costs could be mitigated by drawing from funds in the Global Partnership.223
The U.S. Department of Energy’s Second Line of Defense program, currently focused on providing Russian airports, seaports, and border crossings with radiation detection devices, should quickly be extended to other countries that serve as major transit points for world trade.224 The U.S. government initiated this effort and, as such, it must remain a policy priority under the next administration.225 Without U.S. leadership, nuclear states will lack the wherewithal to successfully detect nuclear trafficking.
Finally, governments must coalesce in a concerted effort to stem the *240 proliferation of nuclear weapons and resume serious strategies aimed at disarmament. States like Iran and North Korea must be engaged to discourage the further development of nuclear weapons and encourage placing civilian programs under IAEA safeguards and security measures. Disarming North Korea and engaging Iran, as well as working more closely with India and Pakistan, must become priorities for the next US administration, since further proliferation will inevitably result in a “proliferation chain” that could increase the chances that terrorists will acquire a nuclear weapon.226 The principal way that developed nations can successfully discourage proliferation is by pursuing disarmament themselves. As the 2005 NPT Review Conference revealed, the United States made no serious move to follow through on Article VI of the NPT and proceed toward disarming its nuclear weapons.227 At this review conference, the United States opposed the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and opposed a treaty that would ban the production of fissile materials. The reason posited for these positions was that nuclear weapons are still needed by the United States as a deterrent against governments that might want to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. Studies show, however, that transference of nuclear weapons non-state actors, even by North Korea, is unlikely. The lesson here seems clear: disarmament by states that possess nuclear weapons provides a compelling way to demonstrate to non-nuclear states that they need not obtain nuclear weapons.228 Thus, nuclear disarmament, or at least substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals, must be seriously considered as a preeminent priority of the U.S. government and other states possessing nuclear weapons.229
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