介绍:
NUCLEAR TRANSITION: FROM THREE MILE ISLAND TO CHERNOBYL
I. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of the commercial nuclear power industry in the United States is experiencing a radical transformation caused by dramatic changes in nuclear power markets and politics. Nuclear power, once the hope and envy of energy suppliers, has been a costly mistake.1 For nearly a decade, no one has invested in new *364 domestic nuclear plants. Instead, regulation is occupied with existing and nearly on-line plants. Furthermore, the nuclear transition has uncovered unanticipated costs attributable to emergency evacuation, plant decommissioning, and waste disposal. Society is now in the process of identifying and allocating these costs. The consequence of these changes is clear. No more nuclear power plant construction will occur in the United States until costs are lowered and industry safety claims receive wide public acceptance. These twin conditions are necessary for any reemergence of nuclear power. This Article addresses the economic and political displacement and realignment of nuclear regulation during the period of transition from the traditional model of regulation to the emerging post-industrial model.
The nuclear transition is not discrete; the government did not announce and implement a conscious policy change.2 Instead, the change is largely unconscious and is taking place gradually. The transition dates from March 28, 1979, the date of the incident at Three Mile Island, to April 26, 1986, the date of the Chernobyl accident. TMI and Chernobyl serve as more than convenient mile-posts in the history of nuclear power. These accidents are stark reminders of the complexities, risks, and costs of government sponsored and regulated enterprises. Furthermore, and more importantly, *365 the events that occurred between these dates have significantly changed the direction of the nuclear and electric industries.
Two overriding characteristics comprise the nuclear transition.3 The first is a shift in emphasis from safety to finances.4 The primary fallout from TMI was financial, not radioactive. In contrast, the real radioactive fallout of Chernobyl can serve as the catalyst refocusing attention on safety.5 The second characteristic is the decentralization of decision making away from the central government toward the states, best exemplified in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission.6 Together, these market and political forces combine to alter nuclear regulation.
Prior to TMI, commercial nuclear power enjoyed wide and at times uniform support. The government saw commercialization as a way to expand the country’s technological superiority, the industry saw nuclear power as a source of great profits, and the public saw cheap and nearly inexhaustible energy.7 People assumed that nuclear plants were safe and that safety was affordable because of the great economies of scale that nuclear plants offered. At that point, however, the country underwent a loss of faith in nuclear *366 power. This loss of faith was not only a metaphorical abandonment, it was also an actual abandonment expressed through plant cancellations. It manifested itself in the marketplace as financing for new plants dried up. Concomitant with market failure was bureaucratic failure. The loss of faith also extended to a disenchantment with centralized decision making. The traditional expertise model of bureaucracy8 gave way as the states gained decision-making authority. These factors became the essence of the nuclear transition.
This Article explores the lessons of the nuclear transition. Part II describes the nuclear market and the signs of fatigue. Part III discusses the political and regulatory responses to market failure. Decision makers9 were simply unwilling, perhaps unable, to let nuclear power die a natural market death. Instead, the regulatory system almost uniformly accommodated the weakening financial condition of the nuclear industry by apportioning losses between ratepayers and shareholders rather than letting the industry absorb all losses. Transitional relief through loss allocation to ratepayers is not defensible from an economic standpoint because the accommodations skew the risks and incentives of nuclear regulation and promote inefficient over-investment.10 The accommodations are understandable politically, however, as explained in Part IV. Briefly, nuclear market failure and the political responses it engendered have demonstrated the need for a new regulatory model. Even though the de facto government relief accorded the industry has delayed what is most likely an inevitable change in *367 utility regulation, the accommodations have forced policy makers to question basic assumptions. The traditional capital-expansionist model of utility regulation that has existed for the last century must be replaced by a more competitive market-centered post-industrial model. The transition exposed the weaknesses of the traditional model and revealed the contours of the next era of nuclear power and electricity regulation. The consequences of nuclear transition range widely beyond changes in administrative agency regulations and affect federal and state regulation of nuclear power, the delivery and regulation of electricity, and the relationship of government and industry in a high-technology world.
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